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Four Decades of Change in the
Commercial Paper Market
The Market in 1920
The earliest available estimate of commercial paper outstanding is for
July 1918, when the Federal Reserve Bank of New York began reporting
end-of-month figures. At that time, outstanding paper of thirty dealers,
who presumably handled virtually all commercial paper, was $874
million—probably a record level.' During the next year and a half,
outstanding dealer paper grew by nearly 50 per cent, reaching a peak of
$1,296 million in January 1920. There was no direct paper until later
in that year, when General Motors Acceptance Corporation began
borrowing on short-term notes without the assistance of a dealer.2
Table 1 provides perspective on the size of the market at the begin-
fling of 1920. The figures show that commercial paper was a distinctly
'See Appendix A for a complete record' of monthly outstandings (without
seasonal adjustment), July 1918 to December 1961. Note that before 1948 these
data include only paper maturing within seven months.
2A number of other finance companies were borrowing short-term funds at
this time through collateral trust notes, which in some cases were placed directly
with banks (or possibly other lenders). These notes resembled commercial paper so
closely that they should probably be included with the latter. Unfortunately, esti-
mates of the magnitude of such borrowing are lacking, and the data on direct paper
outstanding in the 1920's and 1930's therefore underestimate the size of the direct
market. For further discussion of collateral trust notes, see p. 32 below.
The General Motors Acceptance Corporation notes referred to in the text,
like the directly placed notes of other finance companies in this period, were secured.
After 1926, however, GMAC notes were unsecured.
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TABLE1








1.Total commercial paper 1.2 1.0
2.Commercial paper placed through
dealers 1.2 1.0
3.Directly placed commercial paper • — —
4.Corporate short-term debt 22.3 18.6
5.Corporate long-term debt 31.0 25.8
8.Total corporate debt 53.3 44.4
7.Federal government debt 25.6 21.3
8.Bankers' acceptances 1.0 0.8
9.Total loans of commercial banks '25.7 21.4
10.Non-real estate loans of
commercial banks 22.8 19.0
SOURCE: Lines 1 and 2: Appendix A; line 4: Historical Statistics of the United
States, Department of Commerce, 1960, Series X 430; line 5: ibid., Series X 429;
line 6: ibid., Series X 425; line 8: Benjamin Haggott Beckhart, The New York
Money Market, New York, Columbia University Press, 1932, Vol. III, Part 2, p. 310;
line 9: Historical Statistics, Series X 99, mean of June 30 figures for 1919 and 1920;
line 10: ibid., Series X 101, mean of June 30 figures for 1919 and 1920.
minor source of corporate funds despite the boom it was then enjoying.
Similarly, bank loans (part of which consisted of commercial paper) and
federal debt both were far larger than commercial paper debt even at
that time. The volume of acceptances was still somewhat less than
commercial paper outstanding, a situation that was soon to be reversed.
There were 4,395 commercial paper borrowers in 1920 (Table 2).
Few details are available on the identity of borrowers prior to. 1922,
when the National Credit Office began its annual commercial paper
releases. In that year one-third of the borrowing firms (734 of 2,259)
were manufacturers, wholesalers, or retailers of textiles and dry goods;
almost another one-fourth of theborrowerswere in foodstuffs; and
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TABLE2
NUMBEROF COMMERCIAL PAPER 1920-62
Number of Number of
Year Borrowers Year Borrowers
1920 4,395 1942 703
1921 3,676 1943 507
1922 2,259 1944 425
1923 2,171
1946 387
1925 2,754 1947 429
1926 2,743 1948 424
1927 2,490 1949 402
1928 2,354
1951 398
1930 1,674 1952 418
1931 1,239 1953 398
1932 651 1954 449
1933 548 1955 417 1934 625
1956 362
1935 654 1957 335
1936 692 1958 376
1937 782 1959 335
1938 728 1960 327 1939 731 1961 349
1940 734 1962 371
1941 773
SOURCE: National Credit Office.
almost one-fifth were in metals and hardware.3 Firms in leather and
shoes and in lumber and furniture accounted for over half of the re-
maining 27 per cent of all borrowers. All parts of the country were well
represented, but the Chicago, New York, and Boston Federal Reserve
districts consistently accounted for about half of the borrowing firms
during the 1920's.4 According to one observer, much (though by no
3lndustry classifications of borrowers for selected years, 1922-62, are presented
in Appendix B.
4Roy A. Foulke, The Commercial Paper Market, New York, Bankers Publish-
ing, 1931, p. 43.
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means all) of the borrowing was seasonal in nature in The average
debt per borrower was $255,000 (Table 5).
It was noted above that the commercial paper market was virtually
a dealer market in 1920, and that thirty firms were acting as dealers at
that time. About six of these dealers, representing the various regions
of the country, were affiliated in a correspondent system. This group and
fourteen other firms accounted for nearly all of the volume; eight of them
maintained extensive branch systems, with a total of seventy-seven
branches across the nation. Although some dealers were engaged exclu-
sively in the commercial paper business, most of them were active in
other aspects of business finance, particularly securities underwriting.
Average outstandings per dealer were about $37 million (Table 5).
Apparently, most paper was purchased outright from the borrower
in 1920; on the whole, therefore, commercial paper houses functioned
as dealers rather than as brokers. The purchase price was the face value
of the notes, minus the discount computed at the prevailing market rate
and minus the dealer's usual commission of one-quarter of 1 per cent of
the face value (regardless of the note's maturity). Most paper was
single-name and unsecured, although there was still a small amount of
double-name paper in 1920, as well as some collateral notes. Maturities
were in whole months, usually four to six.
The major commercial paper lenders four decades ago were com-
mercial banks. According to a contemporary account:
Sales are made to several types of purchasers. Banks in the larger financial
centers buy either for their own account or for the account of corre-
spondents. Country banks also buy a considerable amount direct from
the commercial-paper houses, while corporations and insurance com-
panies buy a small amount of paper. Sales to corporations are very small
in the aggregate. All data received ... donot place them at over 1 or 2
per cent of the total volume of sales. Sales to insurance companies are
very rare.6
5William H. Steiner, "The Commercial Paper Business," Federal Reserve
Bulletin, August 1921, p. 924. Unless otherwise indieated, the information that
follows on the commercial paper market in 1920 is taken from this source.
6 Thid., p. 928.
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Greef (1938) says, "purchases by... corporationsare probably much
smaller at present than they were about 15 years ago" when some of the
bigger New England textile mills were buying paper.7 However, this
comment is best interpreted as referring to the absolute decline in corpo-
rate commercial paper holdings that was part of the great fall in total
paper outstanding between the early twenties and the middle thirties.
Banks were attracted to commercial paper for several reasons.
Despite the absence of a secondary market, commercial paper was
considered a highly liquid asset, along with call loans and acceptances.
In part, this was because of its eligibility for rediscount at Federal
Reserve banks, when within three months of maturity; but more funda-
mentally, it was because the lack of a customer relationship between
borrower and lender largely eliminated requests for renewals or exten-
sions. Furthermore, banks were able to diversify their risks by lending
to borrowers in a broad range of industries and in distant regions. In
addition, commercial paper provided an attractive outlet for bank funds
during slack periods. Paper yields compared favorably with yields on
most other assets available to banks in 1920. In December of that year,
they were moderately above call money rates at the New York Stock
Exchange and ninety-day time money rates in New York City, and sub-
stantially above bank rates on business loans in New York City, yields
on ninety-day bankers' acceptances, and yields on long-term railroad
bonds.8 There were no Treasury bills at this time.
In summary, the commercial paper market was a minor source of
short-term business funds and a minor but nevertheless significant com-
ponent of bank earning assets at the beginning of 1920. Virtually all
paper was held by banks. Direct placement of paper in the modern
sense was unknown, as was the tailoring of maturities to lenders' speci-
fications. Few if any finance companies were using the market at this
time.
7Albert 0. Greef, The Commercial Paper House in the United States, Cam-
bridge, Harvard University Press, 1938, p. 304.
8Commercial paper yields have been analyzed thoroughly over the period
January 1857 to January 1936 by Frederick H. Macaulay (Some Theoretical Prob-
lems Suggested by the Movements of Interest Rates, Bond Yields and Stock Prices
in the United States since 1856, New York, NBER, 1938). See Macaulay's Table 10,
p. A157, for paper and railroad bond yields and rates on call money and time
money in New York City in 1920. For acceptance yields and rates on business loans
of banks, see the Federal Reserve's Historical Chart Book (Washington, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, issued in September of each year).
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Changes in the Market, 1920-61
A number of striking changes have taken place in the commercial paper
market since 1920. One of these is the dramatic downtrend in outstand-
ings from 1920 to 1933 and the even more dramatic rise since 1945
(Chart 1). Others are the great reduction in the number of dealers and
borrowers, the change in dealer operations and in the character of the
paper itself, the rise of direct placement, and the emergence of non-
financial corporations as the principal lenders and of finance companies
as the principal borrowers.
SIZE OF THEMARKET
Since1920 the commercial paper market has undergone major con-
tractions and expansions, whether judged by the size of outstandings,
number of dealers, or number of borrowers. In terms of outstandings, the
net change has been strongly upward, quadrupling over these decades.
However, the uptrend has not been continuous; in fact, there was a
persistent downtrend in outstandings during 1920-32. Chart 1, reveals
a striking disparity between the dealer and direct segments of the market
in this early period. Throughout its history, direct paper has expanded,
except for setbacks during recessions and during World War H. The
decline in total paper outstanding after 1920 was solely a reflection of
the decline in the then-predominant dealer paper segment. Furthermore,
dealer paper has grown at a markedly lower rate than direct paper since
1932. A large part of the growth in outstandings has reflected the ad-
vancing price level since the Great Depression, but even on a corrected
basis the commercial paper market clearly is much larger today than
in 1920.
Despite its enlarged dollar volume, the commercial paper market
remains a small component of the money market and a minor part of the
American financial system (Table 8). Although outstanding paper
greatly exceeds acceptances outstanding today, it is completely dwarfed
by short-term Treasury obligations, business loans of commercial banks,
and total corporate debt. It appears that the relative standing of com-
mercial paper has not changed greatly since 1920.
While outstandings have been growing, the number of dealers has
persistently declined since 1920. The dealer industry has long consisted
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CHART1
Directly Placed, Dealer, and Total Commercial Paper
Outstanding, End of Year, 1918-61
Source: Appendix A.
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of a handful of "permanent" members supplemented by an unknown
number of sporadic participants, mostly small localized houses.9 There
is no exact count of dealers even today, but it is clear that there were
many more in 1920 than at present. This is indicated by the declining
number of firms that report monthly to the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York (Table 4). There were only ten such firms in 1962, compared
with thirty in 1920.'° Most of the reduction in the number of dealers
took place during 1927-83, when the number fell from twenty-seven
to thirteen.
The shrinking number of dealers has been accompanied by an even
greater reduction in the number of borrowers (Tables 2 and 5 and Chart
2). Over the entire period, the reduction was more than 92 per cent,
with almost a 50 per cent reduction between 1920 and 1922 alone. The
number was fairly constant from 1922 to 1928, but by 1933 there was
only one borrower for every four in 1928. During World War II a further
reduction took place, and the downtrend has continued irregularly and
at a slower pace since the end of the war.
ROLE OF THE DEALER AND CHARACTER OF THE PAPER
It should already be clear that the nature of the commercial paper
market, as well as its size, has undergone alterations since 1920. The
principal changes of this kind are the rise of direct placement, the
tailoring of maturities to lenders' specifications, a shift in the method of
levying dealer charges, and a marked improvement in the quality of
9Describing the situation in the late 1920's, Foulke states that "in addition to
the ten prominent brokers with their establishments of branch offices and the two
correspondent groups, comprising in all twenty-one distinct brokerage enterprises,
there are from nineteen to about forty-five small, local brokerage houses which
are active intermittently from one year to another" (Foulke, Commercial Paper
Market, p. 108).
10 The Federal Reserve Bank of New York does not publish the names of
reporting dealers. However, from direct inquiry of the leading firms it appears that
the following firms reported their outstandings in 1962: Ashwell & Co., °Blanchett,
Hinton, Jones & Granat, Inc., A. G. Becker & Co., Inc., °Conrad Bruce & Co., Gold-
man, Sachs & Co., Lahey, Fargo & Co., & Co, °Piper, Jaifray & Hop-
wood, Salomon Brothers & Hutzler, and Weil, Pearson & Co. Firms designated by an
asterisk are regional affiliates of Weil, Pearson & Co.; all other firms maintain either
offices or headquarters in New York City, except Ashwell & Co., which operates in
Chicago. A ranking of dealers in terms of outstandings is not available, but those
close to the business agree that Goldman, Sachs & Co. is much the largest.
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TABLE3


















3.Directly placed commercial paper 3.0 0.64




5.Total corporate debt (except tradedebt) 155.6 33.11
6.Treasury bills 43.4 9.23
7.U. S. marketable debt maturing
within one year 84.4 17.96
8.Bankers' acceptances 2.7 0.57
9.Total loans of commercial banks 124.9 28.57
10.Commercial loans of commercial banks 45.2 9.62
SouRcE: Lines 1, 2, and 3: Appendix A; line 4: Federal Reserve "Flow of
Funds/Saving Accounts," corporate sector, Federal Reserve Bulletin, April 1962,
p. 481, line c plus line d; line 5: ibid., line U (liabilities in the form of "credit and
equity market instruments"); lines 6-10: ibid.
dealer paper. Many of these changes are closely related to the increasing
importance of finance companies as commercial paper borrowers.
Direct Placement
Unquestionably the rise of directly placed paper from its origin in
1920 to its currently predominant position has been the most striking
change in the commercial paper business during the past four decades.
Direct paper grew persistently in the 1920's and 1930's, except during re-
cessions, and by 1935 it had pulled even with dealer paper in terms of
outstandings. Direct borrowing was suspended during most of 1943-45,
but it recovered promptly after the war. Since May 1948, it has at all
times exceeded dealer paper. At the end of 1961 direct paper was 64
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TABLE5
DEALERPAPER OUTSTANDING, PER BORROWER AND PER DEALER,
1920-61
PerBorrower Per Dealer
Current DollarsConstant DollarsCurrent DollarsConstant Dollars
Year (thousands) (thousands) (millions) (millions)
1920 255 254.2 37.4 37.3
1921 214 337.5 28.2 41.3
1922 335 533.4 29.1 46.3
1923 380 581.0 31.8 48.6
1924 319 500.0 33.2 52.0
1925 261 387.8 27.7 41.2
1928 218 335.4 23.0 35.4
1927 233 375.8 22.3 36.0
1928 204 324.3 20.0 31.8
1929 204 329.6 14.7 23.7
1930 272 484.8 21.7 38.7
1931 181 381.9 11.2 23.6
1932 149 358.9 6.5 15.4
1933 175 408.9 7.4 17.3
1934 240 492.8 11.5 23.6
1935 261 501.9 13.2 25.4
1938 277 527.6 14.8 28.2
1937 368 656.0 24.0 42.8
1988 334 653.6 20,2 39.5
1939 271 540.9 16.5 32.9
1940 320 626.2 19.6 38.4
1941 401 706.0 25.8 45.4
1942 440 685.4 28.1 43.8
1943 359 585.8 18.2 27.2
1944 414 612.4 17.6 26.0
1945 352 511.6 13.2 19.2
1946 450 571.8 17.4 22.1
1947 606 628.6 26.0 27.0
1948 665 637.0 28.2 27.0
1949 592 596.8 23.8 24.0
1950 720 698.4 28.6 27.7
1951 962 838.0 38.3 33.4
1952 1,282 1,148.7 58.6 48.0
1953 1,271 1,154.4 50.8 48.0
1954 1,601 1,451.5 71.9 65.2
(continued)
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TABLE4
NUMBEROF DEALERS REPORTING OUTSTANDINGS TO FEDERAL RESERVE
BANK OF NEW YORK, 1918-62
Period Number Reporting
July 1918 to December 1921 30
January 1922 to December 1927 26
January 1928 to April 1928 25
May 1928 to November 1928 24
December 1928 to October 1929 23
November 1929 to December 1929 22
January 1930 to October 1930 21
November 1930 to April 1931 20
May 1931 to September 1931 21




April 1932 to May 1932 16
June 1932 to February 1933 15
March 1933 to May 1933 14
June 1933 to April 1934 13
May 1934 to August 1934 12
September 1934 to January 1937 13
February 1937 to December 1941 12
January 1942 to February 1943 11
March 1943 to December 1962a 10
SouncE: Commercial Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, monthly
release.
aDuringpart of the period March 1943 to July 1959 there were only nine
reporting dealers.
per cent of total paper outstanding. And impressive though this figure
is, the direct paper share has been running in the neighborhood of 75
per cent in recent years, and has gone as high as 83 per cent in August
1957 (Chart 13).
During 1920-33 General Motors Acceptance Corporation was the
sole direct borrower. It was joined by Commercial Credit Company and
C.I.T. Financial Corporation in 1934, and by General Electric Credit
Corporation in 1952. Table 6 lists the eleven direct borrowers as of
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TABLE5 (concluded)
PerBorrower Per Dealer
Current Dollars Constant DollarsCurrent DollarsConstant Dollars
Year (thousands) (thousands) (millions) (millions)
1955 1,468 1,326.1 61.2 55.3
1956 1,470 1,286.1 53.2 46.5
1957 1,513 1,286.6 50.7 43.1
1958 2,176 1,825.6 81.8 68.6
1959 2,200 1,841.0 73.7 61.7
1960 3,153 2,636.3 103.1 86.2
1961 4,481 3,762.4 156.4 131.3
SouRcE: Average dealer paper outstanding is mean of high and low month-end
figures for each year as shown in Table A-i. Number of borrowers is taken from
Table 2. Number of dealers was derived from Table 3. Constant-dollar estimates
are current-dollar figures deflated by the Wholesale Price Index of the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, 1947-49 =100.
1961.11Tenof the eleven are sales finance companies and the other is a
business finance company, by the definitions employed in this study. Six
are subsidiaries of manufacturers or retailers. All eleven companies are
large; collectively, they probably accounted for 90 per cent or more of
sales finance company receivables in 1961. Outstanding commercial
paper usually exceeds $50 million for even the smallest of these borrowers
and reaches several hundred million dollars for the larger firms.
Direct borrowing has obvious advantages for a large and seasoned
firmwith a strong demand for short-term funds throughout the year.
The dealer function involves significant costs that do not increase
proportionately with borrowings, such as the costs of acquiring the
basic financial know-how and of administering day-to-day operations.
Apparently, the dealers have been slow to share these economies with
hAt least one other large finance company was borrowing directly in 1981 but
was not included in the Federal Reserve figures prior to their revision in June 1962.
All magnitudes relating to direct paper in this study are based on the unrevised
figures. In view of the minor nature of the revisions, it seemed pointless to delay the
study until new calculations and charts could be made.
Late in 1962 the list of direct borrowers included James Talcott, Inc. and
Westinghouse Credit Corporation. Another firm, J. C. Penney Company, was about
to begin direct borrowing as this study went to press in mid-1963.
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CHART2
Dealer Paper Outstanding Per Borrower and Per Dealer
and Number of Borrowers Per Dealer, 1920-61
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their heavy borrowers, with the result that the largest of them have had
a strong incentive to perform the dealer function for themselves. It
should be noted that General Motors Acceptance Corporation borrow-
ings were far above the average for all borrowers even in 1920 and that
by 1.924thecorporation's borrowings were nearly as large as average
dealer paper per dealer (Tables 5 and A-2).
A reduction in the cost of dealer services is not the only advantage
of direct placement. Dealers and banks have always imposed various
rules on paper borrowers, such as the requirement that borrowers main-
tain unused credit lines at banks equal to outstanding paper, in order to
protect the quality of the notes they handle. Although these rules serve
a useful function, they may be unduly restrictive when applied to the
largest borrowers. In bypassing the dealer the direct borrower obtains
greater freedom in conducting its financial affairs. Similarly, dealers may
be less willing than direct borrowers to innovate—for instance, by offer-
ing lenders very short-term paper. Also, the borrower may feel that it
can contact potential lenders more aggressively and effectively than a
dealer who has the notes of a number of competing borrowers to place.
One of the more significant results of direct placement has been an
improvement in the liquidity of commercial paper. There has never
been an active secondary market in dealer paper, and its qualifications
as a liquid asset are based on short maturities, together with the lack of
any customer relationship that might compel lenders to renew loans at
maturity. Of course, direct paper has no secondary market either, but
direct borrowers will repurchase their notes if the lender is faced with
an unforeseen need for cash. Direct borrowers certainly do not encourage
such repurchases, but their willingness to make them does increase the
liquidity of direct paper substantially.
Maturities
Four decades ago, when virtually all commercial paper was indus-
trial paper, maturities were generally four, five, or six months. The same
is true today of industrial paper, but in the meantime this paper has
become a relatively minor part of the market.
The maturities of finance paper, on the other hand, whether dealer
or direct, cover a much wider range; furthermore, they mature on any
date specified by the lender. The maturity range varies among borrowers,
although nearly all finance companies offer paper in the 30- to 270-day
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TABLE6
DUIECTCOMMERCIAL PAPER BORROWERS REPORTING TO
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW Yomc, LATE 1961
Date When Direct
Placement Began
Associates Investment Company 1953
C.I.T. Financial Corporation 1934
Commercial Credit Company 1934
Ford Motor Credit Company 1961
General Electric Credit Corporation 1952
General Finance Corporation 1955
General Motors Acceptance Corporation 1920
International Harvester Credit Corporation 1957
Montgomery Ward Credit Corporation 1960
Pacific Finance Corporation 1958
Sears Roebuck Acceptance Corporation 1957
SouRcE: Commercial Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, monthly
release; and borrower representatives.
range.'2 A few direct borrowers (e.g., Sears Roebuck Acceptance Cor-
poration, Commercial Credit Company, and Associates Investment
Company) have been emphasizing even shorter maturities in recent
years; in at least one case funds are borrowed over weekends. In the
other direction, many finance companies borrow for more than 270 days,
and some for even more than a year. These longer-term borrowings must
be handled as "private offerings" if registration with the Securities and
l2However, the president of a small Chicago dealer firm that specializes in
finance paper has indicated a narrower maturity range for his clients: "Large
national companies will issue a note to mature next Wednesday at two o'clock. This
kind of money has little or no value to our smaller companies. For this reason, we
confine our maturities to four to eight months, with an occasional ninety-day note"
(John W. Ashwell, president, Ashwell & Company, address before American
Finance Conference, Chicago, Illinois, November 6, 1958).
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Exchange Commission is to be avoided. The proportion of direct paper
in the 271- to 365-day category has been very small in recent years—
between 3 and 5 per cent; hardly any dealer paper falls into this category.
No data are available on the average maturity of dealer paper. For
direct paper, however, there are two sets of monthly estimates: those of
Jacobs, for February 1947—May and those prepared during the
course of this investigation, for January 1953—December 1960 (Table 7).
Jacobs found a lengthening of maturities during 1947-51, from a two-to-
three-month range to one of three and a half to four months, with little
if any trend thereafter. The estimates in Table 7, in contrast to Jacobs'
figures, show a rising trend during the 1953-54 recession to about six
months. The discrepancy may result from the fact that in 1953 and 1954
Jacobs' estimates were based on data from two direct borrowers, while
those in Table 7 were based on the figures of a single (third) borrower.
From 1955 on, a trend toward shorter maturities is evident in Table 7,
and by 1959 maturities had returned to their 1947 length of two to
three months.
The origin of the practice of tailoring maturities of finance paper to
lenders' specifications is not known with any certainty. According to one
dealer representative of many years experience, this has been strictly a
postwar phenomenon in the case of dealer paper.'4 Apparently the
practice grew up in the direct market after the early 1930's, when the
three largest finance companies began to tap nonbank sources of com-
mercial paper funds in volume, and was later adopted in the dealer
market as these same sources became interested in dealer paper.
Dealer Charges
The traditional flat one-quarter of 1 per cent commission regardless
of maturity was largely abandoned sometime in the 1930's and replaced
by differential rate quotations to borrowers and lenders.'5 In most cases
'SiJonald P. Jacobs, "Sources and Costs of Funds of Large Sales Finance
Companies," Consumer Instalment Credit, Washington, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, 1957, Part II, Vol. 1, Chart 9.
14 The tailoring of maturities has had an interesting side effect on dealer opera-
tions: most finance paper is now "bought as sold"; i.e., in effect it is handled on
a brokerage basis.
l5William H. Steiner (Money and Banking, New York, Henry Holt, 1933,
p. 325) states that "from about 1920 to 1923, when paper was difficult to sell,
several dealers obtained 1/2 of one per cent [instead of 1/4 of one per cent], but
later reduced their charge again." Steiner also states that a very few large borrowers
paid only one-eighth of one per cent, and that commissions were sometimes "split"
on paper with very short maturities.
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TABLE7
ESTIMATEDAVERAGE MATURITY OF DIRECTLY PLACED PAPER,
END OF MONTH, JANUARY 1953—DECEMBER 1960
(months)
Month 1953 1954 1955 1956
January 4.0 5.3 4.3 3.5
February 3.9 4.2 3.7 4.3
March 5.4 4.3 3.9 3.5
April 5.1 4.1 3.8 3.3
May 3.7 5.8 3.5 2.8
June 3.3 5.7 3.7 3.0
July 3.8 5.4 3.8 3.0
August 3.5 4.9 3.2 2.8
September 3.9 6.1 3.3 2.6
October 4.8 6.5 3.5 2.8
November 3.7 6.0 3.3 2.8
December 4.9 5.4 3.4 2.8
Month 1957 1958 1959 1960
January 3.5 3.4 3.2 2.5
February 2.9 3.3 2.3 2.9
March 2.8 3.1 2.9 3.2
April 2.9 3.1 2.8 2.6
May 2.8 2.9 2.5 2.5
June 2.8 2.9 2.6 2.6
July 2.7 2.8 2.5 2.4
August 2.5 2.4 2.2 2.4
September 2.8 2.2 2.4 2.6
October 2.7 3.1 2.5 2.4
November 2.6 2.9 2.3 2.4.
December 3.3 3.1 2.7 2.8
SouRcE: Data furnished by one direct borrower, 1953-60, by a second firm,
1955-80, and by a third firm, 1958-60.
dealers now purchase notes from borrowers at one price and sell (or
hope to sell) them to lenders at a higher price (lower yield). The mini-
mum rate spread, available to the strongest borrowers, has been one-
quarter of 1 per cent for many years. It should be noted that with the
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adoption of this system the cost of commercial paper funds fell signi-
ficantly relative to yields obtained by lenders and to the cost of bank
credit. Under the earlier system, a flat commission of one-quarter of
1 per cent on three-month paper meant a cost of 1 per cent per annum.
Apparently this shift took place during the Great Depression. As
early as 1932 Beckhart observed that "occasionally no commission is
charged and the profit arises from the difference in spread between the
buying and selling rates. Competition, leading to a smaller profit margin,
is forcing this practice into wider use, though the commission method
is far from being superseded."6 This was an extremely difficult period
for commercial paper, as we have seen, one in which dealer competition
must have been keen. During the 1920's, when paper rates were almost
always above 4 per cent, the commissions were a relatively small part
of total borrowing costs. By the summer of 1931, however, paper rates
had dipped below 2 per cent. From the middle of 1934 until early 1947,
they were 1 per cent or less. With such low rates, the level of dealer
commissions became relatively much more important to the borrower,
and undoubtedly they became the object of increasingly hard bargaining.
Quality of Paper
Another striking change in commercial paper since the early 1920's
has been its marked improvement in quality, as measured by the number
of defaults (or "embarrassments," as they are known in the trade) and
the size of losses.'7 Table 8 presents annual data on these aspects of
quality since 1920. Defaults occurred in every year of the prosperous
1920's, and losses were nearly $1 million in 1924. On the whole, the
market behaved commendably during the catastrophic credit liquidation
of 1929-33. Defaults were far fewer than in the 1920-21 recession. This
is what one would expect, of course, since the number of boriowers also
had declined. Losses were higher in 1931 than in any year since 1925,
l6Benjamin Haggott Beckhart, The New York Money Market, Vol. III, Part 2,
New York, Columbia University Press, 1932, p. 224. Steiner (Money and Banking,
p. 325)speaks,in 1933, of "a newer method forced by competition, which is fairly
general, but still far from usurping the leading position held by the commission
practice."
17 measureof quality is the rating assigned by the National Credit
Office: prime, desirable, satisfactory,fair,or not recommended. These ratings
are of the utmost importance to commercial paper borrowers at any point in time,
but their significance as indicators of quality change over time is doubtful. In any
case, there are no time series on the distribution of outstanding paper by rating
classes.
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TABLE8
DEFAULTSAND LOSSES ON COMMERCIAL PAPER SINCE
Losses as Percentage
of Dealer Paper





1920 31 n.a. n.a.
1921 46 n.a. n.a.
1922 7 112,500 0.015%
1923 7 212,500 0.027
1924 16 996,250 0.124
1925 11 789,700 0.127
1926 4 304,750 0.057
1927 5 610,875 0.110
1928 2 n.a. n.a.
1929 7 118,575 0.035
1980 7 353,775 0.098
1931 16 771,000 0.642
1932 2
1933 8 21,750 0.019
1934 1 •
1935 0
1936 1 47,250 0.021
SOURCE: 1920-28:Beckhart, New YorkMoneyMarket, Vol. III,p. 237;
1929-35: Herbert V. Prochnow and Roy A. Foulke, Practical Bank Credit, New
York, Prentice-Hall, 1939, Table X.
aFrom1937 to 1961, there were seven defaults, one each in 1937, 1938, 1939,
1941, 1948, 1950, and 1961 (National Credit Office). There were no losses during
this period.
and, expressed as a percentage of dealer paper outstanding, they were
over six-tenths of 1 per cent—about five times as high as in 1925. How-
ever, losses were negligible in 1933 and nonexistent in 1932, 1934, and
1935. Since the Great Depression, commercial paper has had an excellent
record. The last year in which lenders sustained a loss was 1936, and
extensions have been made on only three occasions since World War II.
This sharp improvement in quality reflects the altered character of
commercial paper since the early 1920's. Most of today's borrowers are
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sizable firms with national reputations. Furthermore, today's dealers are
experienced firms that do not casually take on new accounts; in addition,
the reduced number of borrowers per dealer (see Chart 2) means that
dealers are able to keep a close watch on the financial condition of
borrowers. This emphasis on quality has facilitated the tapping of non-
bank lenders, a development to which I now turn.
SOURCES OF FUNDS
The most notable change in the sources of commercial paper funds
since 1920 has been the displacement of banks as the major lenders
by nonfinancial corporations. While this shift has taken place to some
extent even within the dealer market, it has resulted mainly from the
rising importance of the direct market, which has long relied heavily
on nonbank sources.
Estimates of month-end holdings of direct paper by the major
groups of lenders are shown in Chart 3. These estimates were derived
by computing weighted average distributions of the paper of six bor-
rowers and applying these averages to the Federal Reserve series on
direct paper outstanding. The classification system is far from ideal. The
principal shortcoming is the inclusiveness of the "all other" group, which
covers paper acquired by banks as agents for others as well as holdings
of individuals, educational institutions, governments, and so forth. In
many instances banks act as agents for their smaller correspondents, but
they are also active on behalf of their corporate and individual cus-
tomers. These undisclosed transactions have become quite important in
recent years.
As'of late 1961 nonfinancial corporations were identified as holders
of about $1.9 billion of direct paper, or 61 per cent of the total. Next in
importance were the "all other" group, with between $500 and $550
million, and "trust funds and investment companies," with only slightly
less. The other three groups—insurance companies, banks, and foreigners
—were relatively small holders, in the $50- to $250-million range.'8
These last three groups have lost ground relative to the first three since
1953—a trend that has probably been under way since the mid-1930's.
18 of foreigners are seriously underestimated throughout the period
because one large borrower has not classified these holdings separately. This firm's
foreign-held paper appears largely inbanks, own account.
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CHART3
Directly Placed Commercial Paper, by Type of Holder,
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NOTESTO CHART 3
Note: Shaded areas represent business cycle contractions.
Source: FRB total is from Appendix A; all other data are estimated holdings of direct
paper at end of month by designated groups. Estimates were made by assembling end-of-
month classifications of outstanding paper by type of holder, prepared by several direct
borrowers. These borrowers accounted for well over half of all direct paper outstanding in
all months. Percentage distributions were computed for these firms and applied to the Federal
Reserve monthly series on direct paper outstanding.
Jacobshas asserted that "prior to World War II, commercial banks were
the major purchasers of directly placed commercial paper."19 Un-
doubtedly this was the case in 1935-36, but the figures in Table 9 suggest
that by 1940 banks were no longer the major holders, even though finance
paper within ninety days of maturity had become eligible for rediscount
for the first time on October 1, 1937. If we assume, contrary to fact, that
all dealer paper outstanding at the end of June 1940 was held by banks,
then the remaining paper holdings of banks presumably consisted of
direct paper. This residual was only 44.3 per cent of total direct paper
outstanding on that date, and by the end of 1941 it had fallen to 35.7
per cent.
The rising importance of nonfinancial corporations and the declin-
ing importance of banks in the direct paper market was noted in 1939 by
Foulke and Prochnow: "Whereas practically all paper handled by com-
mercial paper brokers is sold to banking institutions, the notes of...[the
three direct borrowers] are constantly in demand by railroads, public
utilities, insurance companies, industrial and commercial business enter-
prises, which have surplus funds available for short-term investments."20
Probably the major reasons for this development were the elimination of
interest on demand deposits under the Banking Act of 1933 and the
willingness of finance companies to borrow funds for whatever period
lenders were willing to lend them. With flexible maturities and yields
greater than zero, direct paper was a formidable competitor to demand
deposits.
Unfortunately, data comparable to those shown in Chart 3 are not
available for the dealer portion of the commercial paper market. Repre-
sentatives of some dealers have stated that in recent years the ownership
19 Jacobs, "Sources and Costs of Funds," p. 878.
20A. Foulke and Herbert V. Prochnow, Practical Bank Credit, New York,
Prentice-HaIl, 1939, p. 524.
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TABLE9




























June 1934 151 115 219 08 59.1%
December1934 166 135 257 91 67.4
June 1935 159 153 285 126 82.4
December1935 171 166 310 139 83.7
June 1936 169 327 319 150 45.9
December1936 215 199 378 163 81.9
June 1937 285 272 441 158 57.4
December1937 279 273 420 141 51.8
June 1938
1938
225 203 340 115 56.6
December 187 151 283 96 63.6
June 1939 181 179 284 108 57.5
December1989 210 228 331 121 53.1
June 1940 224 298 356 132 44.3
December1940 218 394 372 154 39.1
June 1941 299 471 458 159 33.8
December1941 375 465 541 166 35.7
SOURCE: Cols. 1-2: Appendix A; Col. 3: Banking and Monetary Statistics, Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1943, p. 109, for all insured commercial
banks; col. 4: Co1. 3 minus col. 1; col. 5: ratio of coi. 4 to col. 2, multiplied by 100.
pattern of dealer paper has been broadly the same as that of direct
paper. This may be doubted, however, for three reasons. First, the
regular end-of-year decline in outstandings, nearly all of which is at-
tributable to nonfinancial corporate holdings, is much less for dealer
paper than for direct paper.21 Second, there is evidence that banks were
2lThe December seasonal adjustment factors for the Federal Reserve dealer
paper series, 1953-60, are: 95.9, 95.4, 94.7, 93.7, 92.8, 91.8, 91.2, and 90.8. For
the directly placed paper series, theadjustmentfactors are: 86.1, 85.3, 84.6, 83.9,
83.4, 83.3, 83.4, and 83.4.
28Pour Decades of Change
the largest holders of dealer paper as recently as 1955, even though their
direct paper holdings are minor. According to the October 5, 1955, survey
of business loans, member banks held $640 million of commercial paper
on that date.22 Of this amount, $396 million consisted of sales finance
paper, including direct paper. Thus member banks held a minimum of
$244 million of dealer paper at a time when total dealer paper was about
$560 million. Undoubtedly, nonmember banks held a few million dollars
of dealer paper as well. Furthermore, according to the estimates under-
lying Chart 3, banks held in the neighborhood of $175 to $200 million of
direct paper in October 1955; deducting this amount from the $396
million of sales finance paper held by member banks leaves an additional
$200 to $225 million of dealer paper held by commercial banks. Alto-
gether, therefore, it appears that banks were holding $450 to $475 million
of the $560 million of dealer paper outstanding in early October 1955.
This interpretation is consistent with the statement of one dealer in 1958
that "a large part of the notes sold through our organization go to
country banks."23
Finally, Jacobs' survey of the marketable securities held by 209
large nonfinancial corporations as of the end of 1957 has revealed direct
paper holdings of $539.1 million but dealer paper holdings of only $8.3
million.24 Total dealer paper outstanding at that time was $551 million,
so this group of firms held only 1.5 per cent of the total, compared with
the 25.5 per cent of total direct paper held by them. Even if generous
allowances are made for dealer paper holdings of nonfinancial corpora-
tions not included in the Jacobs survey, it is clear that all nonfinancial
corporations held only a small part of total dealer paper at the end of
1957. The commercial banks are the only likely alternative holders of the
bulk of this paper. There may well have been a shift away from banks
and toward nonfinancial corporations since 1951, but there is no evidence
that the latter group had supplanted the former by 1960.
The relative decline of commercial banks as holders of commercial
paper seems likely to continue, particularly in the dealer segment of the
market. Corporate boards of directors have been cautious in their search
for yield on liquid assets. Investment of corporate liquid funds in short-
22 Federal Reserve Bulletin, April 1956, p. 337.
23Ashwell, address, American Conference.
24DonaId P. Jacobs, 'The Marketable Security Portfolios of Non-Financial
Corporations, Investment Practices and Trends," Journal of Finance, September
1960, p. 343.
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term government securities has long been accepted; more recently,
investment in directly placed commercial paper has become widespread.
The next logical step, which has already been widely taken, is investment
in prime dealer finance paper. Yield differentials have grown to the point
where, in the last few years, investors in dealer paper have been able
to earn significantly more than investors in direct paper without sub-
stantially greater risk and with nearly the same flexibility in maturities.25
As investment policies are liberalized, more nonfinancial corporations,
universities, and other lenders are likely to turn to the dealer market.
At the same time, as the banking system becomes consolidated and
branch systems grow in importance, banks probably will rely less on
commercial paper for diversification of risks and seasonal adjustments
in earning assets.
25See Chart 12. Note, however, that the yield differentials shown there are
based on comparison of four- to six-month dealer paper with two- jo three-month
directly placed paper. The differentials would, of course, he somewhat smaller if
similar maturities were compared.
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